Fact Check: How Much Money Did the University of Chicago Lose in its Crypto Investment?

By: blockbeats|2026/01/16 12:00:01
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Original Article Title: "Fact Check: How Much Money Did the University of Chicago Really Lose in Crypto Trading?"
Original Article Author: Darren Terminator

Recently, Jiemian News seized the opportunity of the publication of Professor Zhao Dingxin's "Lectures on Society and Political Movements" (the second edition of this book is really good) to interview Professor Zhao. In the interview, Professor Zhao said that the University of Chicago's recent various budget cuts were because "it is said that the school seemed to have listened to investment advice from certain Nobel laureates, traded cryptocurrencies, and lost over six billion dollars. It can be said that the University of Chicago's reduction in liberal arts has nothing to do with Trump's policies."

So did the University of Chicago really lose over six billion dollars in crypto trading?

Fact Check: How Much Money Did the University of Chicago Lose in its Crypto Investment?

Coincidentally, in the FAQ updated by the University of Chicago in December 2025 [1], the matter of cryptocurrency trading was mentioned. According to the official website: "Contrary to a claim in a news report, the University of Chicago did not suffer losses in cryptocurrency investments. Our school's investment in cryptocurrency is relatively small but has more than doubled in the past five years. Our investment goal is to provide a stable source of income to long-term support our school's various projects and secure our school's future."

So is the University of Chicago's Provost definitely telling the truth?

Hard to say. However, intuitively speaking, the total amount of the University of Chicago's donation funds in the last five years is approximately around $100 billion (a record high in the 2021 fiscal year, around $116 billion; in the 2025 fiscal year, around $109 billion [2]). Unless the University of Chicago is really crazy enough to take at least 60% of its own donation funds to trade crypto (which obviously violates various regulations), or embezzle a large amount of operating funds to trade crypto and lose it all, it should not have lost as much as sixty billion.

So how much was actually lost? Or did they actually make a killing as stated in the official FAQ?

The Stanford Daily [3], Financial Times [4], and Investopedia [5] reported on this last year. According to The Stanford Daily, their four sources said: "The University of Chicago lost tens of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency investment around 2021."

So what does the University of Chicago's financial report [6] say?

Unfortunately, the financial report did not directly tell us how much money was lost in crypto trading. However, in the 2022 fiscal year report, the University of Chicago disclosed its cryptocurrency investment (fair market value): around $64 million as of June 2021 and around $45 million as of June 2022 (a difference of approximately $19 million). In subsequent reports, perhaps due to either significant gains or losses, the University of Chicago changed its reporting method and no longer disclosed its cryptocurrency investments. However, according to a 2025 Q&A session, the University of Chicago is still cautiously investing in cryptocurrency.

Of note, the 2022 financial report indicated that as of June that year, the University of Chicago endowment fund had incurred a total loss of approximately $1.5 billion. The 2023 financial report then showed that the University of Chicago's investments only incurred a small loss. In the following two years, the University of Chicago turned a profit.

However, we do not know the specific sources of these losses and gains, especially how much was related to crypto trading. The Stanford University newspaper provided a somewhat unreliable clue: "[The University of Chicago's] target asset allocation shows that the University's ideal mix for private debt and 'absolute return' investments (which include alternative assets like cryptocurrency) has decreased from 25.5% in 2020 to 20% in 2022, implying a significant retreat (or downturn) in high-risk alternative assets."

However, the Stanford University newspaper also made an interesting observation: "From 2013 to 2023, the University of Chicago endowment fund's annualized return rate was only 7.48%, while the stock market's annualized return rate for the same period was 12.8%, and the Ivy League average was 10.8%. If the University of Chicago had simply followed the market performance, its endowment fund would now have an additional $6.45 billion. This (dreamy) sum of money would have been more than enough to pay off all of the school's debt. Of course, universities cannot simply replicate market indices as they must hedge during economic downturns to maintain financial stability. But even if the University of Chicago had only achieved the average level of its Ivy League peer group, its endowment fund size would still be $3.69 billion higher today. This would be enough to cover the school's current budget deficit for the next 15 years."

However, apart from crypto trading and investment losses, what other reasons could explain the University of Chicago's budget cuts?

A common explanation, besides calling Trump a rogue, often emphasizes the University of Chicago's own strategic mistakes: debt leveraging, extensive infrastructure projects, and aggressive expansion. As of the end of June 2025, the University of Chicago's debt is around $9.2 billion, approximately 90% of the endowment fund. Although the financing cost of this debt is relatively low, unlike across the pond, the University of Chicago still needs to pay over $200 million in interest this fiscal year.

Such a high level of debt is certainly not coming out of thin air. Since the turn of the century, the University of Chicago has spent a lot of money on new laboratories, libraries, dormitories, technology, and other facilities to enhance its reputation, attract students, and compete with various long-standing prestigious schools. However, these expansions have been largely supported by significant borrowing. Yet, new infrastructure brings ongoing operating costs, and the university has not figured out how to sustainably fund these expenses in the long term.

The University of Chicago's student newspaper [10] quotes Professor Clifford Ando of the university, who suggests that any parents who are considering sending their child to the University of Chicago need to think about whether the high tuition fees they are paying are contributing to their child's education or to the university's debt. The reckless expansion and the resulting debt issue are clearly the responsibility of a management team that acted irrationally and overly ambitiously. What's even more ironic is that between 2006 and 2022, the university president's base salary increased by 285%. Now, faced with some financial challenges, the university's leadership has shifted the burden onto students and regular faculty members: even in years when assets are sold, staff are laid off, and admissions are frozen, executive compensation continues to rise.

So, what should be the University of Chicago's next steps?

In addition to continuing cost-cutting measures, the university, of course, needs to increase revenue. Evidently, a common trick used by U.S. universities to generate more income is to admit more undergraduate students. The University of Chicago is now following suit, but the justification is sure to be noble.

[1]https://provost.uchicago.edu/actions-budget
[2] Throughout this article, the University of Chicago's budget, endowment, and debt are all calculated by combining the main university campus, the Medical Center, and the Marine Biological Laboratory. Common news reports (especially the university's own press releases) usually combine these figures for the endowment but only consider the main campus for the debt.
[3]https://stanfordreview.org/uchicago-lost-money-on-crypto-then-froze-research-when-federal-funding-was-cut/
[4]https://www.ft.com/content/4501240f-58b7-4433-9a3f-77eff18d0898?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[5]https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/careersandeducation/university-s-investment-losses-spark-outrage-resulting-in-drastic-program-cuts/ar-AA1Nxhgx
[6]https://intranet.uchicago.edu/en/tools-and-resources/financial-resources/accounting-and-financial-reporting/financial-statements
[7]https://www.wsj.com/us-news/education/colleges-face-a-financial-reckoning-the-university-of-chicago-is-exhibit-a-8918b2b0
[8]https://www.ft.com/barrier/corporate/d5c7c0f4-abf1-4469-8dca-87ff01cbebf6
[9] The main campus's debt is around $6 billion. Perhaps this is the source of Professor Zhao's $6 billion.
[10]https://chicagomaroon.com/40486/news/uchicago-professor-sounds-alarm-over-troubling-university-finances/

Original Article Link

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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