If I were the founder of Kaito, how would InfoFi 2.0 survive?

By: blockbeats|2026/01/20 18:00:01
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Original Title: What If: I Were the Founder of Kaito?
Original Author: RYAN YOON, TIGER RESEARCH
Translation: Peggy, BlockBeats

Editor's Note: A one-time API policy adjustment caused InfoFi to "freeze collectively" within three days. This collapse not only exposed Web3's deep reliance on centralized platforms but also revealed another side of incentive mechanisms: the more rewards, the faster the brushing, making quality control more difficult.

This article takes Kaito as a starting point, outlines five possible ways out for the InfoFi project, and points out that InfoFi 2.0 is likely to move towards a smaller scale, stronger screening, and more quality-controlled mode. In addition, a more critical question is, after the airdrops and narrative frenzy fade, what will support the token value of InfoFi?

The following is the original text:

Key Takeaways

X's policy change caused the InfoFi ecosystem to collapse within three days, exposing the structural limits of over-reliance on centralized platforms.

The InfoFi project currently faces five choices: shut down; transition to a task platform based on a reward mechanism; adopt a Korean-style brand sponsorship writing model; expand to multi-platform operations; or transform into an MCN-style KOL management model.

InfoFi 2.0 is likely to evolve into a smaller scale, more controllable model, shifting from "permissionless large-scale expansion" to "collaboration between curated KOLs and project teams."

Two fundamental challenges remain unresolved: how to establish a fair reward system and how to provide reasonable support for the token value.

InfoFi Collapsed Within Three Days

If I were the founder of Kaito, how would InfoFi 2.0 survive?

Source: X (@nikitabier)

On January 15, X's product lead Nikita Bier posted a short update, clearly stating that the platform would no longer allow apps that "exchange rewards for posts" to continue operating. For the InfoFi project, this was almost equivalent to a doomsday verdict.

According to Kaito founder Yu Hu's review, the progression of the event was roughly as follows:

January 13: Kaito received an email from X stating that they may enter the audit process. The team immediately sent a reply requesting further clarification.

January 14: X issued a formal legal notice, and Kaito submitted a legal response on the same day.

January 15: Nikita Bier's public post was published. Kaito, like everyone else, almost simultaneously learned of the final decision.

The market's reaction was unforgiving.

$KAITO swiftly dropped, and the community also began to criticize the team for "claiming to have had a contingency plan in place but failing to warn of the risk in advance." That evening, Kaito issued an emergency statement explaining that they had received legal notices from X in the past, all of which were ultimately resolved by signing new agreements. Therefore, this time the team chose to wait for further communication and negotiation first.

However, regardless of the explanation, reality had become clear enough: one decision by X directly ended the entire InfoFi ecosystem. In just three days, a whole track collapsed entirely because the platform deemed it detrimental to user experience and content quality.

If I Were an InfoFi Project Founder Today

Does this mean InfoFi is already over? Projects like Kaito have actually been preparing for the next steps. But what is truly needed now is not to continue the old model but to find a different form of InfoFi 2.0.

If I were a founder of an InfoFi project like Kaito, what viable options are left in reality today? By examining these "feasible" paths, we may be able to outline what the next stage of InfoFi might look like.

Shutdown

This is the most direct and simplest option: shrink and cease operations as soon as funds run out. In reality, many small and medium-sized projects are likely to enter a "zombie state," no longer actively updating the product, occasionally posting on social media, and then slowly fading away.

Since the product's PMF (Product-Market Fit) was built on top of X, and this foundation has now been taken away, it is more in line with business rationality to cut losses in a timely manner, proactively exit, rather than continue to burn money searching for a new direction.

If the project still holds reusable data assets, it may also consider selling them to other companies to recover some value. It is for this reason that most small to medium-sized InfoFi projects are likely to choose this path.

Reward-Based Task Platform

When unable to continue using X's API, a feasible alternative is to return to a more "traditional" incentive model: have KOLs directly sign up to participate in activities, have their content submitted for manual review, approve it, and then reward them.

This mechanism is essentially more like early "task platforms" or "bounty programs": KOLs apply proactively; the project team manually screens and assigns tasks; creators submit content; the platform settles rewards after approval,

It sacrifices the original automation and scalability, but in exchange for a more controllable execution process. In cases where platform rules are tightening, this "inefficient but compliant" approach is easier to survive.

Source: Scribble

Scribble is a typical case. The project team releases a grant in the form of a "reward task," and KOLs create content and submit it for review. They can only receive the reward after approval. This mechanism is not about real-time tracking and instant settlement but leans more towards a "submit-review" process model.

This structure has the potential to become an open platform: the platform provides matchmaking and infrastructure support, while individual projects are responsible for specific event operations and content management. As more projects join, the KOL pool expands; and as the creator base grows, project teams also have more potential collaborators to choose from.

However, its drawbacks are also evident: high uncertainty for KOLs. If their content is rejected, the time cost invested is lost entirely. After experiencing multiple failures, KOLs are likely to leave the platform.

Korean-Style "Brand Blog" Model

Source: Revu

The Korean "brand blog" model follows a "screen first, then manage" path, rather than the "create content first, then review" approach seen in reward platforms. Institutions like Revu have been operating under this model for over a decade.

The process is also very clear: the project team first sets the target number of participants and launches an activity. After creators submit their applications, the project team selects collaborating KOLs based on metrics such as fan base size and past performance. The selected KOLs receive clear content guidelines and writing requirements. After content publication, it is inspected by operations personnel; if it does not meet the standards, revisions are requested. Failure to submit on time may result in penalties or deductions.

The biggest advantage of this model is that creators are almost never left empty-handed. As long as the selection process is followed and standards are met, the reward can be considered essentially locked in, avoiding the risk of "completion rejection leading to zero labor cost" present in bounty mechanisms. For the project team, since collaborators are pre-screened, quality management is easier, making overall execution more controllable.

Multi-platform Expansion

If X is no longer available, the next viable option is to pivot to platforms like YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, and others. In fact, within the Web3 community, "moving beyond X" has long been a consensus: to achieve meaningful growth, it is necessary to transition from a community primarily composed of crypto-native users to channels where a broader user base is present.

The main advantage of this approach is the significantly larger potential user base compared to X. Especially in emerging markets like Southeast Asia and Latin America, the influence of TikTok and Instagram may be even stronger. Additionally, each platform has its own content distribution logic, so even if one platform is restricted, exposure and operations can be maintained on other channels.

However, the trade-off is a steep increase in operational complexity. On X, only text and interactions need to be reviewed; on YouTube, watch time and production quality directly affect performance; on TikTok, the first three seconds almost determine success or failure; on Instagram, evaluation of Stories, layout, and visual completion is necessary. This requires the team to have platform operation capabilities or establish new tools and processes. Furthermore, platform API policies and data retrieval methods vary, akin to "rebuilding the system."

Policy risks still exist, as any platform could suddenly change its rules like X did. However, a multi-platform presence can at least mitigate single-point risks. For larger projects, this is also the only direction that still offers "scalability space."

MCN-style KOL Management Model

In the Web2 MCN model, the brand value of KOLs inherently determines their commercial value; in Web3, this effect is even more pronounced. Narrative drives fund flows, and the influence of opinion leaders is amplified to the extent that they can directly impact token prices, with a single comment causing fluctuations.

Some successful InfoFi projects have already built a highly active and cohesive group of KOLs. These KOLs are not brought in temporarily from outside but have grown gradually on the platform over months. In contrast to Web2 MCNs relying on continuous "talent discovery," InfoFi is more likely to retain these existing KOLs and shift the platform's advantage towards data-driven management and distribution.

The so-called MCN-ization means that the partnership will transition from a loose "voluntary participation" to a more formal contract and commitment. Leveraging long-accumulated data and relationship networks, the platform's bargaining power in the Web3 ecosystem will also be stronger, making it easier to obtain better partnership terms and resource allocation.

However, this path poses higher demands on the InfoFi project: there must be a sufficiently strong management system, and "data" will become a core asset. If the platform can use data to guide KOLs' output pace, content direction, and conversion effectiveness, and provide the project with a more professional, data-driven Go-To-Market (GTM) strategy, this model may establish a longer-term competitive barrier.

InfoFi 2.0

The collapse of InfoFi left two important lessons for the entire Web3 ecosystem.

First is the irony of decentralization: many Web3 projects actually rely heavily on centralized platform X, and a single decision by X is enough to cause the entire system to collapse.

Second is the boundary of incentive design: the reward mechanism indeed successfully attracted a large number of participants, but the platform lacked effective quality control measures, leading to a rapid proliferation of spam content and gaming behavior, providing X with more than enough reasons to intervene and shut down.

Source: X (@nikitabier)

Does this mean that InfoFi has ended?

Not entirely. A few projects that have truly achieved Product-Market Fit (PMF) may still survive by reshaping themselves, such as transitioning to multi-platform expansion, conducting more curated ad placements, or upgrading to an MCN-style KOL management model.

However, InfoFi 2.0 is likely to become smaller, more controllable, and place greater emphasis on content quality. It will shift from the past open, permissionless, scale-seeking "platform form" to a curated partnership network, more akin to an integrated marketing platform that advances localized GTM and combines components like offline advertising to form a more complete execution loop.

Nevertheless, fundamental issues still persist.

Joel Mun of Tiger Research House points out that once a reward mechanism is introduced, participants will inevitably seek ways to "game" the system, making it nearly impossible to design a fair incentive structure. Such behavior will continue to lower content quality and create a negative feedback loop, ultimately harming the platform itself—the key challenge that the InfoFi project must squarely face.

David raised a more fundamental question. He believed that the value proposition of the InfoFi token, rather than stemming from the platform's actual performance, was more based on "staking airdrops" and "narrative faith." However, both of these have lost their practical significance, so the question was directly raised: Why would investors still buy the InfoFi token?

If InfoFi 2.0 wants to survive, it must provide clear answers to these questions. A project detached from token holders ultimately struggles to achieve true sustainability.

[Original Article Link]

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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